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I
INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GERMAN' COURT SYSTEM
A. The Court Hierarchies
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Basic Law of 1949,2
provides for five different hierarchies of courts. In addition to the so-called ordi-
nary courts with jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, there are labor courts,
social security courts, administrative courts, and tax courts.3 All of these court
hierarchies have at their apex a federal court of last resort. 4 The tax courts form a
two-tiered system; all other court hierarchies comprise a three-tiered system.
In German legal terminology only the courts of last resort are "federal" courts,
whereas the courts below this level are courts of the Ldinder (the ten states of the
Federal Republic and Berlin). 5 The rules determining the organization and the
procedure of these courts, however, are embodied in federal statutes.6 With minor
exceptions, the Ldinder have no original legislative power in this field.7 Their
responsibility extends virtually exclusively to the implementation of the organiza-
tional and procedural statutes enacted by the federal legislature.
The Ldinder, however, do have authority to determine the number and the
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1. Throughout this article the words "German" and "Germany" refer to the Federal Republic of
Germany, unless the context indicates that the reference is to Germany before its partition after World
War II.
2. GRUNDGESETZ lGG], 1949 Bundesgesetzblatt [GBI] I 1.
3. Id art. 95(1).
4. Id.
5. Id arts. 23, 95(1).
6. The organization of the ordinary courts is based upon the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [BGVERFG]
(first enacted in 1877, most recently consolidated on May 9, 1975, 1975 BGBI 1 1077). Their procedure is
governed by the Zivilprozessordnung [ZPOI (first enacted in 1877, consolidated on September 12, 1950,
1950 BGB1 533). The ZPO is sometimes referred to in the text and footnotes as the Code of Civil Proce-
dure.
For surveys and discussions in English of German civil procedure, see Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reftcttons
on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BU1FALO L. REv. 409 (1960); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure (pts. 1-2), 71 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1443 (1958); Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma
anda Solution through Subject Matter Organization, 16 J.L. REFORM 471 (1983); Meador, Appellate Subject Aatter
Organzation: The German Designfrom an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 27 (1981).
7. GG art. 74(1).
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territorial scope of judicial districts within their respective borders, as well as the
number of judgeships assigned to the various courts. The Liinder are also exclu-
sively responsible for the appointment of judges in their territories, and they must
carry the financial burdens of their judiciary.8 On the other hand, the appoint-
ment of judges to the federal courts of last resort is exclusively within the federal
power.9 These judges are ordinarily appointed from intermediate appellate courts
or, in the tax court system, from the courts of first instance.
B. The Ordinary Courts
The foregoing outline suggests that under the German system the subject
matter jurisdiction of the so-called ordinary courts in civil cases is much more
limited than in the United States. Cases involving governmental activities gener-
ally must be litigated in one of the specialized courts (administrative courts or tax
courts). In addition, disputes arising from, or in connection with, employment
contracts, along with collective labor controversies, are within the jurisdiction of
the labor courts.' 0 This leaves the ordinary courts in civil cases an area ofjurisdic-
tion which is in essence restricted to private law disputes involving private liti-
gants.' Of course the government, state or federal, can be a party to such truly
private law disputes if it acted in a nongovernmental capacity, for instance, as the
owner of a building entering into an agreement with a contractor. Also, for histor-
ical reasons, the ordinary courts have jurisdiction in cases of monetary claims
resulting from sovereign acts of the government, such as tort liability for injurious
acts,' 2 or compensation for a taking of property by the government.' 3 Finally,
there is a very limited number of precisely defined instances-in the area of anti-
trust law, for example-where a litigant challenging an act of the government
must bring his case before an ordinary court rather than one of the specialized
courts. 14
The large majority of the issues litigated in civil cases under the German
system, however, involve private interests and legal rules pertaining to such inter-
ests. It is against this background that the following study will attempt to analyze
the final judgment rule in appellate cases within the German system. The rule, its
application, and its exceptions will be studied only in the context of civil cases. Its
application to criminal cases, as well as to cases litigated in the specialized courts,
is beyond the scope of this article.
8. The status of judges, however, is subject to federal law. See Deutsches Richtergesetz, 1972 BGB1 I
713. It is also true that the vast majority of substantive law to be applied by the courts, especially in civil
cases, is federal, not state, law; see Meador, supra note 6, at 29-30.
9. GG art. 95(2).
10. Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz § 2, 1979 BGBI I 853.
11. GVERFG § 13 provides that the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over "civil controversies" (bfirger-
&the Rechtsstreitketen).
12. GG art. 34.
13. Id. art. 14(3).
14. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen §§ 63(4), 73(l), 1980 BGBI 1 1761.
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C. "Noncontentious" and Domestic Matters
Germany, like many other civil law countries, has a tradition of distinguishing,
within the realm of private law disputes, two categories of cases: "contentious
matters" and "noncontentious matters." The various noncontentious matters are
always designated as such in the legislation pertaining to them. Examples include
cases involving probate, 15 the commercial register, 16 and guardianship. 17 The pro-
cedure, including the appellate procedure, in these cases is subject to special statu-
tory rules,' which will not be discussed in this article.
Also excluded from the subsequent discussion are cases involving domestic rela-
tions in the broadest sense of the term. Since 1977, disputes of this description
have been assigned to family courts within the hierarchy of the ordinary courts. 19
Not unlike those divisions of these courts handling noncontentious matters, family
courts are subject to procedural rules largely different from those applicable to
civil cases in general. 20
II
THE VARIOUS MODES OF REVIEW
A. Revision
As pointed out above, only the highest court of each of the five German court
hierarchies is a federal court. The name of the federal court for criminal and civil
cases is Bundesgerichlshof;2 1 it will be referred to in this article by the abbreviation
commonly used in Germany, BC!-.
An appeal to the BGH, due to its different attributes, must be distinguished
from an appeal to an intermediate appellate court and is for this reason designated
by a special term (Revision). The term used for first-level appeals (Berufung) is the
literal counterpart of the English term. A Revziion to the BGHlies from final judg-
ments of an intermediate appellate court,22 known as an Oberlandesgerichl (OLG).2 3
In exceptional cases, a Revision to the BGHcan also be taken from a final judgment
of a court of first instance, called a Landgercht (LG).24 Since such an appeal,
"leaping" over the OLG and therefore termed Sprung-Reviszon ("leap appeal"),
requires consent by the appellee and is subject to further restrictive rules ,25 it is
very rarely attempted and will not be discussed in the remainder of this article.
The characteristics of an appeal to the BGHare similar to those of an appeal in
this country. The purpose of the appeal is to correct errors of law and not errors of
15. BURGERLIcHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 2260.
16. Gesetz uiber Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit [FGG] § 125 1898 Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGB1] 771.
17. Id § 35.
18. See supra notes 15-17.
19. GVERFG § 23b.
20. Id.; ZPO §§ 606(1), 621a-f.
21. GG art. 95(1); GVERFG §§ 123-40.
22. ZPO § 545(1).
23. GVERFG §§ 115-20.
24. Id §§ 59-75.
25. ZPO § 566a.
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fact. 26 An appellant therefore can base his appeal solely on the ground that a rule
of law, statutory or otherwise, was not applied or was incorrectly applied. 27 In
addition, the error of law must have affected the outcome of the case and have
prejudiced the appellant. 28 In certain instances, there is an irrebuttable statutory
presumption of a prejudicial effect resulting from a violation of procedural rules. 29
Such a presumption governs, for example, in the case of noncompliance with rules
concerning the composition or the jurisdiction of the court below.
Until fairly recently, an appeal to the BGHwas a matter of right in many cases.
The almost universal problem of overcrowded dockets, however, has led to gradual
legislative restrictions of this right. Under the present law, a Revision is ordinarily
possible only if the OLG has expressly allowed it in its judgment. 30 The OLG is
bound to grant permission to appeal if the case is of "fundamental significance" or
if the OLG based its judgment on an opinion which conflicts with that laid down
in a case previously decided by the BGHor by a superpanel of the federal courts in
charge of resolving conflicts among these highest courts. 31 The decision by an
OLG to allow the appeal on one of these grounds is binding upon the BGH.32
Irrespective of permission to appeal granted by the OLG, a party can always
file an appeal with the BGHif the amount in controversy on review is more than
40,000 Deutsche Mark (DM) (currently the equivalent of less than $16,000). 3 3
The BGH, however, need not accept the case for a decision on the merits. 34
Rather, it can disallow the appeal, provided two-thirds of the judges competent to
hear the appeal agree that the case is devoid of "fundamental significance. '35 The
appellant is not entitled to an oral hearing before his appeal is disallowed. 36 An
absolute right to appeal to the BGHcontinues to exist in cases where an OLG has
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a (first) appeal from a judgment of a court of first
instance.
37
In summary, the appellate procedure at the highest level under the present
German system is affected by the ability of the BGH to control its caseload. To be
sure, on its face, the exercise of this control does not involve discretion as broad as
that exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court in granting or denying certiorari. Still,
the determination that a case lacks "fundamental significance," while strictly
speaking a decision on a question of law, allows the BGH to apply stricter or more
26. Id § 549(1).
27. Id. §§ 549-50.
28. Id § 549(1) (requiring that the challenged decision be "based" (beruht) on the "violation"
(Vcrletzung) of a rule of law).
29. Id § 551.
30. Id § 546(1).
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id § 554b.
35. Id § 554b(l), (2); see also GVERFG § 139(I) (providing that five judges shall form a BGHpanel).
This rule, enacted in 1975, was attacked on constitutional grounds. The two panels of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court could not agree on the issue, the full court eventually upheld the enactment interpreting it
so as not to authorize an a AInune denial of review in cases where the appeal has a chance to prevail. See
Judgment of June 11, 1980, 54 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 277 (1980).
36. ZPO § 554b(3).
37. Id. § 547.
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lenient standards of scrutiny, in keeping with the demands of the court's docket.
Strangely, however, the responsibility for the exercise of this control is divided
among the intermediate appellate courts and the BG--, as explained above. 38 The
purpose of entrusting a share of this responsibility to the OLG is to reduce the
burden of summary review for the BGH however, the device is questionable on
due process grounds.
B. Berufung
Unlike a Revision to the BGH, an appeal (Berufung) to an OLG is not limited to a
review of errors of law. 39 Rather, it is designed to rectify the result reached by the
court below (the LG) on questions of fact as well as on points of law.40 To allow a
review and reversal by the OLG on factual grounds, the LG need not even have
committed an error of fact in the strict sense. This is so because the appellant (and
also the appellee) is entitled to present new facts and new evidence in the interme-
diate appellate court. 4 1 This principle is subject to certain restrictions, so as to
discourage dilatory tactics, 42 but by and large the procedure in the OLG amounts
to trial de novo.43 The OLO has the record of the LG before it, since this record is
passed on to the OLG immediately after a notice of appeal has been filed. 44 In
considering questions of fact the OLG is, however, in no respect bound by the
record. It is not limited by the record; it can consider new facts and/or new evi-
dence if presented. In fact, the OLG has the power, if appropriate, to rehear evi-
dence already in the record.4 5
The civil panels of the OLG are composed of three judges, 46 and the court's
appellate jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the LG has rendered a final
judgment as a court of first instance. This jurisdiction is limited only to the extent
that in a pecuniary controversy the amount involved on review must exceed 700
DM (currently the equivalent of less than $300). 47 In nonpecuniary matters, the
monetary requirement is by definition inapplicable.
The OLG does not have appellate jurisdiction over decisions by the LG where
the LG is not a court of first instance. In a group of cases, defined by statute, the
LG functions not as a court of first instance, but as an appellate court. 48 The LG
has appellate jurisdiction in cases which are within the trial court jurisdiction of
the Amisgericht, (AG).49 This court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
several types of specific controversies. Among them is litigation between a
38. Compare ZPO § 546 with ZPO § 554b (lower court must allow appeal in certain cases, but higher
court may dismiss appeal lodged at the party's discretion).
39. ZPO § 519(1), (3) (requiring grounds for the appeal without confining the grounds to errors of
law).
40. Id § 537.
41. Id § 519(3)(2).
42. Id. §§ 527-31.
43. Id. §§ 523, 525.
44. Id. § 544.
45. Id §§ 523, 525.
46. GVERFG § 122.
47. ZPO § 511.
48. GVERFG § 72.
49. ZPO § 511; GVERFG § 72.
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landlord and tenant involving the rental of rooms, apartments, and houses for
dwelling purposes (Wohnraummiete), in which the right to possession, repossession,
or use of the property, or to a renewal of the lease (based on a statutory right under
certain Civil Code sections) is in issue.50 In addition, the AG has concurrent juris-
diction in matters not exceeding an amount in controversy of 7,000 DM (currently
the equivalent of less than $3,000).-5 Cases litigated in the AG before a single
judge can be appealed to the LG, subject again to a monetary minimum require-
ment of 700 DM in pecuniary matters, and without such a restriction in nonpecu-
niary matters. 52
As an appellate court, as well as in its role as a court of first instance, the LG
sits in panels of three judges.5 3 The appellate procedure in the LG follows the
same rules applicable to an appeal to the OLG.54  It is essential, however, to
emphasize that judgments rendered by the LG on appeal from the AG, unlike
judgments of the OLG, are not subject to any further review in an ordinary court. 55
This follows from two rules previously stated: (1) An appeal to the OLG lies only
from final judgments rendered by the LG as a court of first instance;56 (2) An
appeal to the BGHby way of Revision is available only from final judgments of an
OLG 57 or, by way of Sprung-Revision, from a final judgment of an LG sitting as a
court of first instance.58
The restriction imposed on the reviewability of final judgments of the LG in
cases originally litigated in the AG is commonly justified as a consequence of the
limited significance and weight of these controversies. An interesting debate with
some bearing on the final judgment principle arose in this regard when it was
recently found that inconsistencies in the case law among various L, and even
within one LG, affected a large number of people and were felt to be intolerable by
substantial segments of the public. Even though this debate did not prompt the
legislature to make appealable any appellate judgments of the LG, a different
method of review, certification of a question of law to a higher court, was estab-
lished. 59 This means of resorting to the resources and authority of a higher tribunal
or of a coordinate superpanel is a feature of the German court system which will
be analyzed separately below.6°
50. GVERFG § 23(2)(a).
51. Id § 23(1).
52. ZPO §§ 511-511a(1).
53. GVERFG § 75.
54. ZPO §§ 511-544 apply indiscriminately to any appeal from a judgment rendered by a court of
first instance.
55. The only possible means of review is through a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, pursuant to GG art. 93(l)(4)(a). This article authorizes review where a litigant's constitu-
tional right has been violated by official authority, a rare occurrence in a civil case.
56. ZPO § 511; see supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
57. Id. § 545; see supra tcxt accompanying notes 22-23.
58. Id § 556a, Tee rbra text accompanying notes 24-25.
59. Law of June 5, 1980, 1980 BGB1 1 657, amendzing Drittes Gesetz zur Anderung mietrechtlicher
Vorschriften of Dec. 21, 1967.
60. See iqfra text accompanying notes 71-80.
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C. Beschwerde
The Beschwerde, a further method of review under German law, will be referred
to, for lack of a more satisfactory translation, as "limited appeal."'6' It is available
in certain specifically designated instances and in all cases in which a motion con-
cerning a matter of procedure is denied, provided the law does not require the
judge to grant an oral hearing to rule on this motion. 62 With only a few excep-
tions, decisions of the OLG are not subject to a limited appeal, whereas most deci-
sions rendered by an AG or by an LG can be challenged in this fashion. Details
must be discussed below, because viewed from the perspective of the final judg-
ment rule, the availability of a limited appeal is frequently tantamount to an
exception to this rule. Since the Beschwerde is sometimes the means of effecting the
review of a final decision, however, it would be entirely misleading to translate the
German term as "interlocutory appeal."
There are two different kinds of limited appeal. The "simple" (elnfache) limited
appeal can be filed any time after the challenged decision is rendered; no running
of a specific period of time precludes the use of this remedy. 63 On the other hand,
the "prompt" (soforlige) limited appeal must be filed within two weeks after the
decision has been served upon the aggrieved party or, in certain cases, after it has
been announced in open court.64
A simple limited appeal ordinarily must be filed in the court whose decision is
attacked; only in urgent cases can it be filed in the higher court.65 The policy
behind this rule is that the court below has the power and should, if possible, be
given an opportunity to reconsider and vacate its decision. 66 Only if the court
concludes that there is no reason to comply with the appellant's demand will the
case proceed to the higher court.67
In cases where the law provides for a prompt limited appeal, the court whose
decision is challenged has no authority to reconsider and vacate.68 The power to
decide upon the limited appeal is vested exclusively in the higher court.69 The
filing can be effected alternatively in this court or in the court below. 70
D. Vorlageverfahren
A study of the final judgment rule under German law would be incomplete
without an analysis of the various certification procedures (Vorlageverfahren), men-
tioned above in connection with the virtually absolute finality of appellate judg-
ments of the LG 7 1 Such procedures are a significant element in the plethora of
61. This is the translation adopted in Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1445.
62. ZPO § 567(1).
63. See id. § 567 (defining the prerequisites of a simple limited appeal without setting a time limit).
64. Id § 577(2).
65. Id § 569(1).
66. Id § 571.
67. Id
68. Id § 577(3).
69. Id
70. Id § 577(2).
71. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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methods of review in the German legal system.
In some instances, certification of a legal question serves as a substitute for an
appeal. More specifically, where the jurisdiction of a judicial body cannot be
invoked by the parties to a case for purposes of review, German law sometimes
provides for the certification of a legal question to this body, a higher court, or a
superpanel of the court in which the case is pending.7 2 In other instances, certifi-
cation of a question of law is required, or at least permitted, while the case is still
being litigated in a lower court, even though the final judgment of that court will
be subject to review upon appeal. 73
To illustrate the first variety of certification procedure, the recent debate over
the nonappealability of appellate LG judgments is instructive. This debate
unfolded in the media and among lawyers over disputes concerning the rental of
rooms, apartments, and houses for dwelling purposes (Wohnraummiele). Without
regard to the amount in controversy, cases in this area are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the AG and therefore reviewable only on appeal to the LG. Such
appeal is limited further to cases involving a right to possession, repossession, use of
the property, or to renewal of the lease, where the right is derived from certain
statutory provisions.7 4 To counteract the public dissatisfaction that developed as a
result of irremediable divergencies in the case law (irremediable because of the
unavailability of appeal beyond the LG), the legislature resorted to the creation of
a new device to remedy these conflicts. It did so, however, without opening up
new avenues of appeal.
This device, denominated Rechisentscheid, is the most recent brand of the certifi-
cation procedure. It leads to a decision of a question of law by an OLG-even by
the BGHupon judicial initiative while the case is still before the LGon appeal and
has not yet been disposed of by a final judgment. 75 The LG panel in a dispute
involving, for instance, the rental of rooms for dwelling purposes is now required
by statute to certify a question of law to the OLG if it intends to deviate with
respect to that question from a decision of the BGHor of an OL, or if the legal
question is of "fundamental significance" and has not yet been decided by Rechi-
senischeid 76 Before certifying the question of law to the court above, the LG must
ask the parties for written statements of their opinion on this question and is
required to attach their statements to its request for a Rechisentscheid.7 7 Should the
OLG in turn conclude that it intends to depart from a decision of the BGH or
another OL, it must certify the question of law to the BGH.78
The standard of "fundamental significance," which is used to control the
caseload of the BGHin the area of Revszon (appeal), is thus also used to obtain a
decision from an OLG in certain cases which are not within its appellate jurisdic-
tion. This standard can be invoked for the purposes of avoiding or resolving
72. FGG § 28; GVERFG § 136.
73. GG art. 100(1), (2).
74. GVERFG § 23(2)(a).
75. Law of June 5, 1980, art. 111(l), 1980 BGB1 I 657; see also supra text accompanying note 59.
76. Law of June 5, 1980, art. 111(1), 1980 BGBI I 657.
77. Id
78. Id
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conflicts in the case law among various LG or within one LG. It was the very
purpose of the statutory amendment to accomplish this result.
Furthermore, the Rechisen/scheid constitutes an innovation in the area into
which it has been introduced. In response to public demands, it makes available
for the first time the resources of higher courts in a social arena and in a field of
law which has traditionally been viewed as not deserving or not requiring these
resources. This is certainly a remarkable development. In the context of this
article, however, it is probably more noteworthy that the technique which the leg-
islature employed for the implementation of its policy is by no means novel. The
certification of a question of law to a particular court or a particular panel of a
court by a judge prior to his rendering a final decision in the case before him is
frequently mandated by rules of procedure in Germany,7 9 and, to some extent, by
the Treaty of Rome in the European Community.8 0
The policy underlying all of these rules is in certain respects the direct opposite
of the policy which is sometimes invoked to justify the final judgment principle.
An adoption of this principle appears to proceed primarily on the premise that the
resources of a higher court should not be tapped until after the case is completely
disposed of at the lower court level and all the resources of the lower court have
been brought to bear on the case. In contrast, a certification procedure seems at
least partly to rest on the assumption that it is wasteful and sometimes beyond the
authority of a lower court to decide questions of law which require a uniform and
authoritative pronouncement at a higher level before the individual case can prop-
erly and most efficiently be decided.
III
THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Basic Approach
With respect to the finality ofjudgments as a requirement for civil appeals, the
German law at first glance appears to be clearly and succinctly stated in two sec-
tions of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to section 545 of that Code, a
Revision to the BGH lies from final judgments rendered by an OLG as an appellate
court.8' To this the Code adds that Revision can be had according to certain enu-
merated provisions.8 2 The subsequent Code sections, however, do not make
inroads on the principle of finality stated in section 545; rather, they limit the
power to attack a judgment by way of Revision even where the judgment is final.8 3
Using language very similar to that of section 545, the Code of Civil Procedure
provides in section 511 that a first appeal (Berufung) is available from final
79. See, e.g., FGG § 28; GG art. 100(1).
80. See Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 76-77 (establishing the European
Economic Community) (effective Jan. 1, 1958).
81. ZPO § 545(1).
82. Id
83. See, e.g., id. §§ 545(1), 546. Some of these limitations were discussed in Part II, supra. Others do
not warrant discussion since they are not directly relevant to the issue of finality and do not contribute
significantly to an enhanced understanding of the framework of German appellate review.
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judgments rendered by a court of first instance8 4 By virtue of this rule, Berufung
can be used to attack a judgment of the AG by means of review by the L, or to
attack a judgment by the LGon review by the OL, provided the LGexercised its
jurisdiction as a court of first instance, and not as an appellate court.8 5 Even
though section 511, unlike section 545, does not contain a proviso, the Code spells
out the previously discussed restriction on the right to a first appeal in section
511 a, which is to the effect that in pecuniary matters there will be no Berufung
unless the amount in controversy on review exceeds 700 DM.
8 6
Neither of the two basic rules stating the German variant of the finality prin-
ciple (that is, neither section 545, concerning Revzsion, nor section 511, applicable
to Berufung) attempts to define the term "final judgment." Thus the impression of
clarity and succintness created by these Code sections is somewhat deceptive. In
fact, none of the rules relating to review of judicial decisions in sections 511
through 577 of the Code supplies anything even remotely resembling a definition
of final judgment or an enumeration of the decisions appealable as final
judgments.
Guidance appears elsewhere, in sections 300 through 329 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, under the heading of Urteil (judgment). Section 300(1) directs the
courts to render a final judgment, if "the controversy is ripe for final decision." '8 7
It is tempting to conclude that a final decision in this sense and, consequently, a
final judgment, is a decision which disposes of all the issues in controversy between
all the parties to a particular case. Such a conclusion would be clearly erroneous,
as can be gleaned from several other rules in sections 300 through 304.
Immediately following the basic rule of section 300(1) which mandates a final
judgment where a controversy is ripe for final decision, the Code provides in sec-
tion 300(2) that, if cases were consolidated by the court for the purpose of simulta-
neous trial and decision, and only one is ripe for final decision, the court must
render a final judgment.8 It follows from this provision that in cases of multiple
parties and/or multiple claims which were originally involved in separate cases,
but were then consolidated by the court under section 147 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a decision disposing of less than all the consolidated cases is a final
judgment and such decision must be made, with no discretion granted to the
court, as soon as one or more of the consolidated cases is ripe for decision.8 9
Going one step further, section 301(1) provides that a final judgment ordinarily
must be rendered if only one of several claims, only a (separable) part of plaintiff's
claim, or, if a counterclaim was filed by the defendant, only the claim or the coun-
terclaim (but not both) is ripe for final decision. 9° The Code expressly terms this
84. Id § 511.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
86. ZPO § 511a.
87. Id. § 300(l).
88. Id. § 300(2).
89. ZPO § 300(1) unambiguously provides that "the court must render final judgment" where the case
is ripe (emphasis supplied). Section 300(2) provides, in equally clear terms, that when one of several con-
solidated cases is ripe for decision, section 300(1) applies as well.
90. The term "counterclaim" is used here the same way as in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
the United States. The corresponding German term is Widerklage.
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kind of final judgment, a Teiurtei, which in English would be a "partial judg-
ment" (as distinguished, obviously, not from an impartial, but from a complete
judgment). The Code further provides in section 301(2) that the court need not
render a Teiluredi if in view of the circumstances it would be inappropriate. 9'
Legal writers and courts try to clarify the terminology as well as the law itself
by using the term Teil-Endurtei (partial final judgment) so as to dispel any possible
doubt regarding the finality of the partial judgment under discussion. 92 Their
attempt at clarification is entirely consistent with the language and the purpose of
section 301. Obviously, this Code section is designed to allow and even to compel
piecemeal adjudication and piecemeal appeals, subject only to the limited discre-
tion of the court to withhold its decision until the entire controversy can be
decided and laid to rest. Partial judgments appear to be favored by the Code and
are treated as final judgments with or without an express statement to that effect
by the court.
B. The Setoff Exception
A similar policy emerges from section 302 of the German Code of Civil Proce-
dure. This section deals not with a counterclaim, but with a setoff by the
defendant and applies to situations where the claim underlying the setoff has "no
legal connection" with the plaintiffs claim, as the Code phrases it, thereby expres-
sing the converse of the principle of "connexity. ' '93 Typically, this means that
defendant's alleged claim arises from a transaction or occurrence other than that
on which plaintiffs claim is based. The Code provides in section 302(1) that under
these circumstances the court may enter judgment for plaintiff, reserving the deci-
sion on the setoff if the proceedings are ripe for decision only on the plaintiffs
claim.94 Furthermore, section 302(3) provides that such judgment "'s to be regarded
as a final judgment with respect to review and enforcement. '95
While the rules in sections 300 and 301 pertaining to multiple parties, multiple
claims, separable parts of a claim, and counterclaims can be viewed as instances of
an application of the finality requirement, 96 the rule pertaining to setoffs in section
302 undeniably dispenses with that requirement. The plaintiffs claim does not
exist if there is an effective setoff. At the time the court gives judgment for plaintiff
on the basis of section 302(1), it is uncertain whether the setoff will be held to have
91. ZPO § 301(2).
92. L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT, § 55 II 2 (12th ed. 1977).
93. See Blomeyer, Types ofReh'fAvailable (Judicial Remedies) in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 4-128 (1982). In civil law systems the principle of "connexity" is generally understood
to be a means of limiting the right to withhold performance because a counterclaim exists, or the right to
exercise a setoff. For instance, BGB § 273 permits the debtor to withhold performance if he has a claim
arising from "the same legal relationship." On the other hand, BGB § 387 allows a setoff to be used
whenever two parties owe each other money or other fungible goods of the same character, regardless of
whether the mutual claims arose from the same legal relationship. Against the backdrop of this substantive
law rule, ZPO § 302 enables the courts to engage in piecemeal adjudication where a setoff involves unre-
lated claims, or, in civil law terminology, where there is no "connexity" of the mutual claims.
94. ZPO § 302(l).
95. Id § 302(3) (emphasis added).
96. The argument supporting this view is that with respect to, for instance, one of the parties or one of
the claims, there is a disposition of the case which, to this extent, leaves nothing for the court to do.
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been effective. Therefore the court's judgment does not determine with finality
that the plaintiff has a claim. Rather, the judgment in plaintiffs favor is a condi-
tional one, as is clearly spelled out in section 302(4). This section provides that the
case remains pending in the court once it has reserved its decision on the setoff,97
which, under section 302(2), it can be compelled to do, if necessary, by a motion to
supplement its judgment in conformity with section 321 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.9"
Section 302(4) goes on to provide that the court must reverse its own prior
judgment if, in the course of the subsequent proceedings, it finds that (because of
an effective setoff) the plaintiff's claim(s) did not exist. 99 Furthermore, by virtue
of section 302(4) the defendant is entitled to damages if he suffers a loss as a conse-
quence of an enforcement of the conditional judgment;' ° ° these damages can be
claimed as part of the pending case in the court which first rendered and then
reversed the conditional judgment. 0 1
The upshot of this in the present context is that section 302 of the German
Code of Civil Procedure permits the defendant to appeal a nonfinal judgment on
the basis of the legislative fiction that the judgment "is to be regarded" as final for
review purposes. At the same time the defendant is allowed to proceed with his
setoff defense in the first court. Rather complex and intriguing questions arise
when the appeal is successful before the setoff issue is decided or, conversely, when
the court below reverses its judgment while the appeal is still pending. These
ramifications of an application by the courts of section 302 unfortunately cannot
be pursued here.
C. The Interlocutory Judgment Exception
If an action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or similar
procedural reasons unrelated to the merits of the case, the decision is ordinarily a
final judgment under German law as well as U.S. law, since in the court's view it
can dispose of nothing further. On the other hand, a court which considers a
jurisdictional or a similar procedural defense unfounded, need not decide the issue
before the merits of the case have been litigated.io 2 Should the court choose to
render a judgment on all procedural and substantive issues after the case has been
fully tried, there is again a final judgment under both legal systems.
The court may prefer to decide a procedural issue before all the issues have
been fully litigated. The court's reason to opt for such strategy can be the preclu-
sion of the parties from rearguing a matter which, in the court's view, has been
sufficiently argued. Section 303 of the German Code of Civil Procedure enables
97. ZPO § 302(4).
98. Id. §§ 302(2), 321.
99. Id § 302(4).
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id § 303. This section permits the court to decide an interlocutory dispute by an interlocutory
judgment, but carefully avoids mandatory language. It states that the court can, (i.e., has the power to)
render such judgment. The skillful drafting technique used in German codes clearly leaves it to the court's
discretion whether to decide a jurisdictional issue separately or together with the merits of the case.
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the court to proceed in this fashion. It provides that a Zwischenstreit (a preliminary
or collateral controversy) can be decided by Zwzschenurtezl (an interlocutory judg-
ment) once it is ripe for decision.10 3 This applies to any preliminary or collateral
controversy not directly involving the subject matter of the case-a line which, in
cases where a party's duty to release documents is contested, for example, is some-
times difficult to draw. 0 4 An interlocutory judgment based upon section 303 is
not appealable, because it is not final. It lacks finality since it does not dispose of
the case as such, either in its entirety or with respect to certain parties or certain
claims or separable fragments of claims.'0 5
Furthermore, section 303, unlike section 302, does not contain language
reflecting the legislative fiction that the interlocutory judgment for purposes of
review "is to be regarded" as a final judgment.1 0 6 Consequently, a party adversely
affected by a judgment under section 303 must wait until after the case is disposed
of by a second judgment which has the characteristics of a final judgment. Pro-
vided this judgment is appealable by that party, the appellate court ordinarily will
have the power to review, together with the final judgment, all decisions preceding
it in the court below. This rule applies to both a Revzst'on (pursuant to section 548)
and a Berufung (purusuant to section 512).107
Decisions which the Code of Civil Procedure expressly designates as being
immune from any direct review, however, cannot be incidentally reviewed under
sections 512 and 548. 108 An illustration of this exception is a ruling of the court
below permitting the plaintiff to amend or modify his complaint. 0 9 By contrast,
section 303 does not expressly deny review. The consensus among courts and
writers therefore supports the reviewability under sections 512 and 548 of interloc-
utory judgments based on section 303, as an incident to appellate review of a final
judgment. 110
103. Id
104. Such duty may originate from substantive law. See, e.g., BGB § 810; ZPO § 422. On the other
hand, it may result from the course of litigation itself. See ZPO §§ 421, 423-27.
In this area, confusion on the part of litigants and the courts appears not infrequently to occur. Where
a court renders the wrong kind of decision, the BGHhas held that a party is entitled to review if either the
decision as rendered or the one which should have been rendered is reviewable. Judgment of June 20,
1977, BGH, 92 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 362 (1979); accord id at 364-69, note P. Gottwald
(and authors cited therein). This result is rationalized as the "most favorable treatment" (Mfestbegunstgung)
due the victim of a judicial mistake. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 133 II.
If, however, the court decides by interlocutory judgment an issue which must not be decided other than
by final judgment, the BGH allows no immediate appellate review. Judgment of October 18, 1951, 3
Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 244 (1951); accord K. Tiedtke, Das unzu/'assige Zwischenurtei, 89
Zeitschrift ffir Zivilprozessrecht 64, 74-75 (1976). The court also denies any binding effect to such a judg-
ment. Judgment of Feb. 5, 1953, 8 BGHZ 383 (1953).
105. Nonetheless, since the decision takes the form of a judgment and is not merely an order, it is
binding upon the court. ZPO § 318. This precludes any further arguments by the parties relating to the
issue decided upon. See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, J. ALBERS & P. HARTMANN, ZIVILPROZES-
SORDNUNG, § 303 annot. 3 (40th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as BAUMBACH].
106. Compare ZPO § 303 with § 302.
107. ZPO §§ 512, 548.
108. Each section contains a proviso to the effect that a decision preceding the final judgment may
not be incidentally reviewed if it is not directly reviewable.
109. See ZPO §§ 263-64, 268.
110. See BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 512 annot. 1; L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, at
762.
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A different situation arises where an interlocutory judgment holding a com-
plaint to be zuldssig (admissible) is rendered pursuant to section 280 of the Code of
Civil Procedure."' Typically, such a judgment overrules a defense based on lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, lack of capacity on plaintiff's part, and
the like. Section 280(1) of the Code empowers the court to conduct a special
hearing to try such issues, pertaining to the so-called admissibility of the com-
plaint." 2 According to section 280(2), an interlocutory judgment on these issues
"is to be regarded" as a final judgment for purposes of review.' 13 With language
identical with that in section 302 (dealing with setoffs),' 1 4 section 280(2) creates a
fictional "finality" in order to make a particular kind of nonfinal judgment appeal-
able. The policy underlying this preferred treatment of certain decisions by the
Code appears to be a deliberate choice in favor of avoiding a possible waste of
time, energy, and cost. The court below might expend such resources on the
merits of the case unnecessarily, if the court above subsequently finds the first
court had no jurisdiction or the complaint was for some other reason inadmissible.
In view of this policy, it would seem that the appealability of an interlocutory
judgment on admissibility should not turn on whether the judgment was preceded
by the special hearing on that issue allowed by section 280(1) of the Code. Even if
the judgment was rendered after one or more hearings during which both the
admissibility and the merits of the complaint were argued (and, possibly, evidence
was taken), the judgment should be appealable on the basis of section 280(2). The
prevailing view of German courts and witers supports this interpretation. 15 Those
favoring the minority view can argue that there is a close spatial connection
between this rule and section 280(1) which provides for an optional special hearing
on admissibility. This fact, however, seems to be outweighed by the policy consid-
eration favoring conservation of judicial resources, coupled with the argument that
the minority position allows the lower court to manipulate appealability by
ordering or withholding a special hearing.
Undeniably, however, a certain degree of inconsistency can be found in section
280(2), just as in similar rules providing for review of nonfinal decisions. Such
rules assume that early appellate control over the basic procedural correctness of
the proceedings below is desirable in order to avoid expenditure of efforts and
resources at the lower level which may later be rendered unnecessary by a reversal
based on procedural defects. These rules can be fully effective in accomplishing
their policy only if the case will not be litigated, and possibly terminated, in the
lower court while the appellate court has the appeal before it. Should the lower
court, after rendering the interlocutory decision in favor of plaintiff, continue to
try the case while defendant appeals that decision, then the purported aim of
avoiding wasted time, energy, and money is likely to be thwarted; the desired
111. ZPO § 280.
112. Id. § 280(1).
113. Id. § 280(2).
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. See Judgment of Oct. 17, 1956, BGH, 1957 JURISTENZErrUNG 95; L. ROSENBERG & K.H.
SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 55 III 2 (and authors cited therein). Contra 1957 JURISTENZEITUNG 96 annot. L.
Rosenberg.
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savings will be lost, in part or entirely, depending on how and when the appellate
court decides the issue.
Section 280(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly enables the court whose
interlocutory judgment on the admissibility of the complaint is appealed to order
further hearings on the merits if so requested by motion.' 16 In the literature, it is
pointed out that the plaintiff's motion should be granted only in cases of urgency
or where the chances of the defendant's prevailing on appeal are minute."' 7 Obvi-
ously, this leaves much room for discretion by the lower court judge whose decision
is attacked and who may have a natural inclination to attribute little weight to the
appeal.
The court's order granting or denying plaintiff's motion for further hearings on
the merits is itself subject, to some extent, to appellate review. The device of lim-
ited appeal, discussed more extensively later in this article, may be available by
analogy to section 252 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for limited
appeal from a decision ordering or refusing to order a stay of the proceedings." 8
Thus, the appellate court has some control over the further proceedings below
during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal. This applies only so long as the
interlocutory appeal is taken from a decision of the AG or the LG; limited appeal
can be used to attack certain decisions of these courts but, according to section
567(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it generally cannot be used to appeal deci-
sion of the OLG." 9 Consequently, an OLG which has rendered an interlocutory
judgment holding the complaint to be admissible and whose judgment is attacked
by Reviszon to the BGHis not subject to review of its decision to grant the plaintiff's
motion for further hearings on the merits.
This is presumably a rare case, primarily because the OLG is an appellate
court; in civil cases it never functions as a court of first instance. 20 Therefore,
when a case reaches the OLG, it has already been litigated in the court below. If
the lower court held the complaint to be inadmissible and the OLG reaches the
same conclusion, it must render a final judgment to that effect.' 2' On the other
hand, if the OLG considers the complaint to be admissible after it was held to be
inadmissible by the LO, the appellate court must reverse and remand the case.i 22
The OLG would itself grant an interlocutory judgment on the admissibility
116. ZPO § 280(2).
117. See R. ZOLLER, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 280 annot. III (12th ed. 1979).
118. The rule in section 252 goes further than the more general rule on limited appeals stated in
section 567, see supra notes 62, 63, and accompanying text; infra pp. - While section 567 permits a party to
appeal an order, not based on a mandatory oral hearing, which denies a motion concerning a matter of
procedure, section 252 makes a limited appeal available not only against an order denying, but also against
an order granting a stay. By analogy, this applies to an order granting or denying plaintiffs motion for
further hearings after an interlocutory judgment pursuant to section 280(2) on the admissibility of the
complaint was rendered. See BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 280 annot. 3 B a (relying on Judgment of Dec.
3, 1970, OLG Karlsruhe, 1971 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRwr 662 and authorities cited therein).
Contra, Judgment of Feb. 18, 1974, OLG Munich, 1974 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRifr 1514; R.
ZOLLER, supra note 117, § 280 annot. III.
119. ZPO § 567(3).
120. GVERFG § 119.
121. ZPO § 300.
122. Id. § 538(1), (2).
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issue only when the first court has held the complaint to be admissible and,
without rendering an interlocutory judgment to that effect, decided the case on the
merits.123 The OLG, however, is unlikely to do so; rather, it will probably rule on
this issue in the final judgment, unless it appears that the litigation on the subject
matter will take a great amount of time, making it desirable to get an early
binding decision on the admissibility issue. Under these circumstances, the OLG, if
its interlocutory judgment is appealed, will in all likelihood await a decision by the
BGH on this issue. The test of urgency of the subject matter or of minute chances
of a successful appeal, which is said to determine whether further hearings shall be
ordered, 124 will hardly ever be met. For these reasons it is not of great practical
significance that an interlocutory order by the OLG, in the exceptional case where
it is granted, cannot be attacked by limited appeal.
D. The Basis-of-Recovery Exception
Where an action is brought for an amount of money including, but not limited
to, money damages, and the basis, as well as the amount, of recovery is in contro-
versy, a German court is enabled by section 304(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
to render a judgment on the basis-of-recovery issue only. This presupposes that the
plaintiff's claim is not held to be entirely without basis; if no basis for the claim is
found, the action must be dismissed 125 by a judgment, which is by its very terms a
final decision, since it leaves nothing for the court to decide. If, however, part of
the basis for plaintiff's claim is held to be well-founded, whereas another part is
not, section 304(1) applies so long as the claimed amount of recovery could be
justified on either basis. Should the well-founded ground fail to support recovery
of the entire amount claimed, a final judgment dismissing the complaint with
respect to the excess must be rendered. This judgment can be coupled with a
judgment in accordance with section 304(1) respecting that part of the basis of
recovery which the court regards as valid. 126
An example in point would be an action for damages based both on breach of
contract and on the commission of a tort. To the extent that plaintiff claims dam-
ages for pain and suffering (which under German law he must specify as an item
separate from actual damages) and the court concludes there is a basis for recovery
in contract, but not in tort, a final judgment dismissing the action in the amount
claimed for pain and suffering must be forthcoming. The court in its discretion
may enter a further judgment (often included in a single document with the first
one) upholding plaintiffs cause of action in contract so far as the basis of recovery
is concerned; but the amount of recovery is, by hypothesis, not yet ripe for
decision. 12 7
123. See id § 303.
124. See R. ZbLLER, supra note 117, § 280 annot. III.
125. See id § 304 annot. III 1; H. THOMAS & H. PUTZO, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 304 annot. 1
(12th ed. 1982).
126. 2 F. STEIN & M. JONAS, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 304 annot. I 2 b a (19th ed. 1972); R.
ZOLLER, supra note 117, § 304 annot. II 5.
127. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Schneider, Probleme des Grundurteils in der Praxis (II),
1978 MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHEs RECHT 705, 793.
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A judgment rendered in conformity with section 304(1) and upholding the
basis of recovery, either in whole or in part, is subject to an attack by appeal, even
though it is clearly not a final judgment. This follows from section 304(2), which
provides that the judgment "is to be regarded" for purposes of review as a final
judgment. Here, too, one encounters the legislative technique of fiction. The
Code further provides in section 304(2) that the court can grant a motion for fur-
ther hearings insofar as it has held the basis of plaintiff's claim to be well-founded.
This rule is analogous to that embodied in section 280(2) regarding interlocutory
judgments on the admissibility of the complaint; consequently, the above com-
ments on that rule apply in most part here as well. 128 Courts, however, are gener-
ally more inclined to continue with a case after rendering an interlocutory
judgment on the basis-of-recovery issue than after rendering such a judgment on
the admissibility of the complaint. In conformity with this tendency of the courts,
commentators and other writers advocate a standard for determining whether to
grant a motion for further hearings under section 304(2), that is less restrictive
than that advanced for the same determination under section 280(2).
The reasons for these variations in approach are obscure. Policy considerations
seem to require application of a similar or even identical test in both instances.
The general rule should be that, absent exceptionally compelling interests on the
part of the plaintiff or an exceptionally weak position on the part of the defendant
regarding his appeal, the lower court should not continue and possibly terminate
the case on the merits, or on the amount of recovery, while the appeal is still
pending. A more lenient position in this respect is at odds with the alleged purpose
of rules allowing an interlocutory appeal. The investment of time, energy, and
money necessary to decide a case on the merits or on the amount of recovery
would not thereby be avoided. It may indeed turn out to be wasteful, if upon
appeal the interlocutory judgment is reversed, so that defendant wins regardless of
the court's decision on the merits or the amount of recovery.
On a doctrinal, but at the same time very practical level, it must be asked what
happens to a final judgment in favor of plaintiff resulting from the further hearing
and, possibly, the taking of evidence in the lower court, once the appeal is decided
in defendant's favor and the appellate court's judgment is not subject to further
review. While there is no case directly in point, writers today agree that the final
judgment of the lower court under such circumstances loses its effectiveness and
the appellate court's decision prevails; this result obtains even where the final judg-
ment has not been appealed and the period for filing an appeal has expired so
that, on its face, this judgment is res judicata.129 Arguably, the lower court's final
judgment should be viewed as conditional.' 30 Even though the terms of the
implied condition are not clearly spelled out in the literature, it is fairly obvious
that the continued existence of the interlocutory judgment is regarded as the cru-
128. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
129. F. STEIN & M. JONAS, supra note 126, § 304 annot. III 4; L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra
note 92, § 55 III 3b; Schiedermaier, Die Wirkung der Anfechtung von Zwischenurteden nach §§ 275, 304 ZPO auf
das Endurtei/, 1961 JURISTICHE SCHULUNG 212.
130. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 55 1II 3b; Schiedermaier, supra note 129, at
214.
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cial factor. 13 1 Furthermore, the argument continues, since the lower court's final
judgment is deprived of its effects automatically, the court need not reverse it.132
Such reversal is said to be not only unnecessary but even precluded because section
318 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes every judgment, interlocutory or final,
binding upon the court from which it originated. 133 This, however, is a doubtful
analysis. The defendant's interests would be better protected if the continued
appearance of an enforceable judgment could be removed.
The rule in section 318 is not without exceptions. In the case of a setoff, 1
34
section 302(4) authorizes the court, and in fact makes it mandatory upon the
court, to reverse its interlocutory judgment for plaintiff once it finds the setoff to
have been effective. 135 Since the interlocutory judgment based on section 302 is
viewed as a conditional decision, just as much as is the final judgment rendered
during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal based on section 304, a very good
argument can be made by analogy in favor of a reversal which would protect the
defendant's interests more effectively and become a matter of public record. This
analysis would conform to the civilian tradition of Code interpretations.
A second and final point concerns the overall experience with a rule like section
304, which allows an appealable interlocutory judgment on the issue of the basis of
recovery, as distinguished from the amount of recovery. The rule is said to serve
the purpose of accelerating litigation.' 36 This objective is probably attained at
times, but the courts are criticized not infrequently, because the application of the
rule tends to increase the problems and the expenses involved in litigation. 37 The
BGH also admonishes the lower courts not to lose sight of the principal policy
underlying the rule and not to apply it where legitimate interests of a party advise
against such application.138 Arguably, however, it is not solely the courts' fault if
the rule does not yield satisfactory results in a great number of cases. The abun-
dance of appellate cases interpreting section 304 suggests that it is much harder to
apply it consistently and in a coherent fashion than the seemingly simple
dichotomy underlying it (basis versus amount of recovery) reveals. 139 An inordi-
nate amount of case law evolved from the continuous efforts of the BGH and the
intermediate appellate courts (OLG) to demarcate the two elements of this
dichotomy sufficiently so as to prevent the lower courts from going astray too fre-
quently. 140 Yet the consistently large number of reversals on this issue compels the
conclusion that these efforts have met with little success.
Possibly, this failure must be attributed to conceptual difficulties inherent in
131. L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 55 111 3b; Schiedermaier, supra note 129, at 214.
132. L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 55 II 3b; Schiedermaier, supra note 129, at 214.
133. ZPO § 318; see Schiedermaier, supra note 129, at 214 n. 11; see also F. STEIN & M. JONAS, supra
note 126, § 304 annot. III 4 (somewhat inconclusive on this point).
134. ZPO § 302(4).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
136. See R. ZOLLER, supra note 117, § 304 annot. I.
137. Id.
138. See cases cited by BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 304 annot. I.
139. See id. § 304 annots. 3 1 B, C, D; R. ZOLLER, supra note 117, § 304 annots. II 4, 5, 6.
140. BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 304 annots. 3 1 B, C, D; R. ZbLLER, supra note 117, § 304 annots. II
4, 5,6.
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the dichotomy itself. Does, for example, a defense of comparative negligence
(available under German law in tort and contract cases) affect the basis in terms of
a percentage reduction or only the amount of recovery? What about a partial
assignment of plaintiff's rights or a partial attachment or subrogation by operation
of law? These and many other questions regarding classification of particular legal
situations in view of the distinction between the basis and the amount of recovery
have troubled the courts enormously.' 4 1 The time, energy, and expenditure
devoted to the resolution of these questions in many cases probably exceeds by far
the potential benefits from the rule embodied in section 304 of the German Code
of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the case law requires the lower court to consider the measure-of-
recovery issues, at least summarily, before it renders an interlocutory judgment on
the basis-of-recovery issue.1 42  This requirement is designed to protect the
defendant from irreparable harm which he may incur if he is defeated on an inter-
locutory appeal and therefore bears considerable cost (including his opponent's
attorney fees under German fee-shifting rules), only to find out a little later that
the amount of recovery is negligible or indeed nil. Under these circumstances,
defendant's expenditures would be much less (or could, in a case of dismissal by
virtue of the final judgment, be completely shifted to the plaintiff) had there been
no interlocutory judgment. 143
The summary review of measure-of-recovery issues thus required hardly
increases the speed of the proceedings. On the other hand, from the plaintiff's
perspective there are serious potential disadvantages involved in an interlocutory
judgment based on section 304. Such a judgment is by its very terms incapable of
enforcement, whereas a final judgment determining not only the basis but also the
amount of recovery can in most instances be executed even while an appeal is
pending. In order to prevent execution, defendant must at least provide a security
bond. 144  The plaintiffs obtaining these benefits of a final judgment can be
delayed substantially, perhaps by as much as several years, by the defendant's
appeal (Berufung), and possibly a second appeal (Revision), from an interlocutory
judgment, provided the litigation on the amount of recovery in the lower court
does not proceed during the pendency of the appeal(s). Arguably, this accounts
for the courts' tendency to grant motions for further hearings on the measure of
recovery in an effort to mitigate the plaintiffs plight. In sum, the experience with
141. A telling statement by courts and writers is that the line between the basis and the amount of
recovery must be drawn according to procedural economy and practical efficiency. When most recent
Supreme Court cases sum up decades of judicial efforts to provide more reliable guidance concerning this
distinction. in this way, it is not unfair to interpret such statements as almost unlimited admissions of
failure. See BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 304 annot. 3 (and cases cited therein).
142. Judgment of Nov. 4, 1960, BGH, 74 ZEITSCHRIF-r FUR ZIVILPROZESS 279, 280 (1961). For addi-
tional cases, see H. THOMAS & H. PuTzO, supra note 125, § 304 annot. 3B; F. STEIN & M. JONAS, supra note
126, § 304 annot. I 2 B 03, -y.
143. The BGH has held that there is no exception to the rule requiring a defeated appellant to bear all
the expenses (including his opponent's attorney fees) of an interlocutory appeal, even if the final judgment
is in his favor. In doing so, the court admitted that the results may be harsh. See Judgment of May 29,
1956, 20 BGHZ 397 (1956).
144. ZPO § 712.
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section 304 of the German Code of Civil Procedure does not lend support to advo-
cates of this kind of a departure from the final judgment principle.
E. The Limited Appeals Exception
A general outline of this type of review was provided in Part II of this article. 1
45
The basic rule, stated in section 567(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, is that a
decision can be challenged by limited appeal in all instances specifically provided
for in the Code. 146 If there is any rational principle that has guided the legislature
in making or not making such specific provision and in deciding whether to
require a prompt limited appeal or to permit a simple limited appeal, it has obvi-
ously remained unintelligible to the lawyers who, in their respective roles as judges
or authors, have failed to discern a common thread running through the numerous
Code sections allowing a limited appeal. In sharp contrast with the general belief
that codes in civil law countries are always systematically organized and based on
rational principles closely adhered to, the matter here under consideration fur-
nishes a prime example of haphazard legislative patchwork. This is not to say that
codes of civil law countries generally fail to meet the standard of well-structured,
principled legislation, but such failure can, on occasion, be observed.
In the absence of an intelligible principle expressing overarching policy consid-
erations, it is impossible to convey to the reader an all-inclusive general idea of the
kinds of situations in which the German Code of Civil Procedure has created fur-
ther specific exceptions to the final judgment rule by permitting limited appeal.
However, a few examples can be furnished.
If a motion to disqualify a judge is denied, the order can be challenged by a
prompt limited appeal under section 46(2) of the Code. Consequently, a party
desiring to attack such order must avail himself of the right to a limited appeal.
Ordinarily, of course, under section 512, decisions preceding a final judgment can
be reviewed upon appeal taken from that judgment. 14 7 That section, however,
with respect to a first appeal (Berufung), excludes those interlocutory decisions
which are subject to an attack by limited appeal. This exception applies to all
decisions preceding a final judgment which are subject to a limited appeal. Thus,
the party aggrieved by such a decision has no choice but to bring the limited
appeal, or else to forego the right to challenge the decision.
A third party who finds it advisable to intervene in a pending case in support
of one of the parties to this case may do so according to sections 67 and 71(1) of the
Code, provided he or she can make a prima facie showing of a "lawful interest"
(rech/liches Interesse) in the victory of the party to be supported. 148 A motion to deny
the intervention must be decided upon not by an order, but by a judgment,
termed a Zwischenurtezl (interlocutory judgment), which is reviewable by prompt
limited appeal under section 71(2). 14 9 Arguably, a decision denying the interven-
145. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
146. ZPO § 567(1).
147. ZPO § 512; see supra text accompanying note 107.
148. ZPO §§ 67, 71(1).
149. Id. § 71(2).
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tion might even be viewed as a final judgment because it purports to terminate the
case in this court vis-a-vis the third party; and yet, strangely, a prompt limited
appeal instead of a regular appeal is provided.150
A witness who is summoned by the court to appear at a hearing (the standard
procedure under German law) and does not comply will have costs and a fine
assessed against him by court order. Pursuant to section 380(3), the witness may
challenge such an order by a simple limited appeal. 15' If a witness refuses to tes-
tify, invoking any of the several grounds for a privilege, 152 the court must decide
this issue by an interlocutory judgment reviewable under section 387(3) by prompt
limited appeal.' 5 3 Should the witness refuse to testify, either without giving a
reason or after an alleged privilege has been denied by a judgment which has
become res judicata, then costs and a fine will be assessed against him not by a
judgment, but by an order which under section 390(3) is subject to a simple lim-
ited appeal. 154
These examples may suffice to illustrate the confusion resulting from that
branch of section 567 of the German Code of Civil Procedure which allows a lim-
ited appeal in all instances for which specific provisions are made. In addition, the
second branch of this basic rule supplies a more general test for determining
whether a decision can be attacked by limited appeal. Under this test, any deci-
sion that denies a motion concerning the proceedings and that does not require an
oral hearing is subject to review, except a decision relating to costs, fees, and
expenses where the amount in controversy on review does not exceed 100 DM
(currently the equivalent of about thirty-five dollars). 55 Decisions of the OLG,
however, are generally not reviewable by limited appeal.' 5 6
Despite its more general terms, the second branch of the rule in section 567 also
necessitates a case-by-case determination of the availability of a limited appeal; a
procedural ruling by the court denying a motion can be attacked in this fashion
only where the court's decision did not require an oral hearing. It is immaterial
whether an oral hearing was in fact conducted. The only crucial factor on which
this test turns is the applicability of any of the statutory rules in the Code of Civil
Procedure which dispense with the requirement of an oral hearing as a prerequi-
site for the particular decision.'5 7 What is the policy underlying the use of the
absence of a mandatory oral hearing as the basis for deciding that a decision is
reviewable by limited appeal? It is usually, and perhaps thoughtlessly, stated in
150. There are a number of differences between these means of review, of which two are particularly
significant. The period for filing a prompt limited appeal is two weeks. ZPO § 712. The period for an
appeal (Berufung or Revision) is one month. ZPO §§ 516, 522. The review proceedings in the case of a
limited appeal are very informal with no right to an oral hearing granted by the Code, whereas in the
proceedings on ordinary appeal, oral hearings are strictly required. Compare ZPO §§ 567-76 wi/h ZPO
§§ 520, 555.
151. ZPO §380(3).
152. See ZPO §§ 383, 384.
153. Id. § 387(3).
154. Id § 390(3).
155. Id. § 567(2).
156. ZPO § 567(3). The three exceptions to the rule enumerated in section 567(3) need not be dis-
cussed for present purposes; these exceptions have no immediate bearing on the topic at hand.
157. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 144 II 2 a.
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terms of sifting out less important decisions for this mode of review.' 5 8 There is
little or no discussion in German legal literature that attempts to square this policy
with the purposes of the final judgment principle expressed in sections 511 and 545
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 59 Obviously, these purposes are better served by a
rule which permits review of less important decisions preceding the final judgment
only on appeal from the final judgment. At present, however, German law is to
the contrary.
This can give rise to startling consequences. Sometimes a limited appeal may
be available from an interlocutory decision, even though the final judgment in
that case is not subject to review by appeal. For example, judgments of the LG
upon appeal from the AGare not reviewable at all; 160 nonetheless, the rules in both
branches of section 567 open avenues for review of less important decisions of the
LG, rendered prior to its final judgment as an appellate court. This is paradoxical,
but German writers and courts, while carving out certain exceptions, conclude
from an analysis of the Code of Civil Procedure and other statutes that the Code
does not embrace a general principle by which the power to review an interlocu-
tory decision cannot be vested in a court that is without power to review a final
judgment in the same case. 16 1
The so-called exceptions in favor of coordinating the power of interlocutory
review with the power to review final decisions may not be in every respect gen-
uine exceptions. To be sure, courts have held and writers have argued, in defense
of such exceptions, that interlocutory review in a case where the final judgment is
not reviewable does not permit the higher court to express and substitute its views
for those of the lower court regarding the merits of the case. 162 This is truly a
judicial gloss on the Code in the direction of harmonizing the availability of inter-
locutory review with the nonreviewability of a final decision in the same case. In a
second category of alleged exceptions, however, are orders accompanying a non-
reviewable final judgment and concerning such issues as the execution of the judg-
ment or the correction of the text of the judgment because of errors in
computation and the like.163 A third group is made up of orders issued in cases
terminated without a judgment on the merits rendered by the same court-for
example, where the case has become moot during pendency on appeal to the LG,
and, upon motions by the parties, this court decides (pursuant to section 91a. 164 )
who must bear the costs, including attorney fees. 16 5 Also included in this group
158. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 144 I; BAUMBACH, supra note 105, survey
preceding § 567 annot. 1.
159. ZPO §§ 511, 545; see supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
161. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 148 1112; BAUMBACH, supra note 105, § 567
annot. 5.
162. See L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 148 III 2 (and cases cited therein); BAUM-
BACH, supra note 105, § 567 annot. 5 (and cases cited therein).
163. L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 148 III 2 (and cases cited therein); BAUMBACH,
supra note 105, § 567 annot. 5 (and cases cited therein).
164. ZPO§91a.
165. L. ROSENBERG & K.H. SCHWAB, supra note 92, § 148 III 2 (and cases cited therein); BAUMBACH,
supra note 105, § 567 annot. 5 (and cases cited therein).
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are appellate decisions by the LGin the form of an order, not a judgment, denying
a preliminary injunction.
The second and the third group of cases do not involve interlocutory orders
insofar as, at the time they are issued, the case as a whole has come, or is coming,
to a close.1 66 To this extent, the orders whose reviewability is at stake are final in
character, leaving nothing else of which the court can dispose. Consequently, the
courts denying limited appeal in these instances, given the language of section 567
coupled with more specific rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, are not confronted
with the task of coordinating two avenues of review potentially available in the
same case, one designed for final judgments, the other for interlocutory decisions.
They merely curtail review by limited appeal in situations where this is the only
possible remaining means of review. In doing so, they take account of the fact that
the orders in question supplement a final judgment (effecting its execution or cor-
rection) or take the place of such judgment (deciding the cost issue after a case
became moot). From this it is apparently concluded that no review of these orders
must be permitted where there is no review of the final judgment of which the
order is a part or for which it is a substitute. This is a far cry from bringing
interlocutory appeals in line with appeals from a possible subsequent judgment.
The foregoing discussion underscores the point made in Part II of this article,
that limited appeal (Beschwerde) must not be equated with, and the German term
must not be translated as, "interlocutory appeal" because in certain instances this
means of review can be used to control final decisions.1 67 Thus if the AG, or the
LG in its role as a court of first instance, decides on costs (including attorney fees)
after the parties have stated that the case was moot and applied for an order on
the cost issue, the order can be challenged by limited appeal pursuant to section
9 1a. The decision thus challenged is final in that it disposes of the case on the
merits and leaves no question open for judicial determination. By allowing an
adversely affected party to challenge the order through limited appeal, the Code in
this situation does not deviate from the finality principle. By the same token, the
courts do not vindicate this principle when they disallow limited appeals from cost
orders of the LG in an appellate case. Rather, this case law enforces treatment
equal to that given the standard ruling on costs included in a final appellate judg-
ment of the LG, which is not subject to an appeal. The rationale of the latter
approach is that an isolated decision on costs which terminates the proceedings
without a judgment, should not enjoy a higher degree of reviewability than the
same kind of decision embodied in a final judgment.
In the last analysis, the rules permitting review of interlocutory decisions by
way of limited appeal cannot be reconciled with the final judgment principle and
its policy. The ensuing lack of consistency in the German system of appellate
review can probably be attributed to historical factors predating the Code of Civil
Procedure. The predecessor of limited appeal in the pre-Code era (the modern
166. This applies to all situations in these two categories except for appellate orders denying prelimi-
nary injunctions.
167. See supra p. 41.
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Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1877.168) was the querela simplex which, in
turn, seems to have originated from canon law procedure. It is tentatively sub-
mitted that, since the final judgment rule was alien to this law just as it was to
equity, the problem of reconciling the predecessor of limited appeal with a finality
requirement for appeals did not arise under canon law. When the final judgment
rule became a part of more modern civil procedure and was eventually embodied
in the 1877 Code, the querela simplex was preserved in the form of limited appeal
(Beschwerde). It is very likely that the limited appeal became a part of the modern
system without its reevaluation in view of the changed system of appellate review
based on the finality principle.
F. The Certified Question Exception
As pointed out in Part II of this article, the certification of a legal question to a
higher court is not infrequently required or at least authorized by German law. 169
To the extent that this device is provided for in a court whose final judgment is not
subject to an appeal, such as appellate judgments of the LG, it can be argued that
allowing certification does not constitute a departure from the finality require-
ment. This argument assumes that the finality requirement is merely concerned
with the proper timing (the "when"), not with the feasibility (the "if") of appellate
review. Arguably, with this assumption as a starting point, certification of ques-
tions of law to a higher court that has no jurisdiction upon appeal because the final
judgment of the lower court will be immune from appellate review does not
encroach on the policy supporting the finality requirement. The parties cannot
use certification for purposes of delay, since only the lower court, and not the par-
ties, decides whether there will be certification. 7 0 Furthermore, the upper court's
resources are not tapped more than once, as may happen where interlocutory as
well as final decisions are appealable.
From a somewhat broader perspective, a rule denying, with respect to certain
judgments, any review by appeal is typically based on policies which overlap with
those behind the finality requirement. Where the "if" of an appeal is answered in
the negative by the Code or a statute, the principal purpose is likely to be the
protection of appellate courts from overcrowded dockets. Thus, the denial of
appellate review by the legislature in certain cases seeks to reduce the strains upon
the appellate system, just as does the requirement of a final judgment as a prereq-
uisite for review. However, a rule affording a judgment absolute finality and a rule
requiring finality before appeal-notwithstanding the large measure of identity of
purpose and semantic affinity between the two-have, in effect, completely dif-
ferent qualities.
Even so, certification can be a questionable device in several respects. First and
foremost, the parties are not before the judicial body to which the legal question is
certified, so that no exchange of arguments between them and no communication
with the judges is possible. Also, these judges do not always benefit from a com-
168. See supra note 6.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
170. Set FGG § 28; GVERFG § 136; GG art. 100(1), (2).
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plete record below, since certification may occur before all the issues have been
fully litigated. 17 1 Finally, it is possible that the certified question can become irrel-
evant in the course of further litigation, so that the certification procedure would
turn out to be wasteful in the eyes of at least one of the parties. With respect to the
last two points, which are closely related to each other, the problems inherent in
the certification device are similar to those arising from interlocutory appeals.
They stem from the fact that litigation in the court below has not yet come to a
close. In this respect, some of the reasons supporting the finality principle also
provide grounds for criticism of extremely frequent legislative use of the certifica-
tion device.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the German law relating to the final
judgment principle is no less confusing and bewildering than the law of federal
civil appellate jurisdiction in the United States. The principle of finality is riddled
with exceptions in both systems.
These exceptions are sometimes so limited in scope that their practical signifi-
cance does not warrant a departure from the final judgment principle at the risk of
creating unnecessarily complicated procedural situations. This would seem to be
true of the setoff exception in section 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17 2
Sometimes an exception is expressed in statutory language which seems to
invite judicial manipulation and thus reveals a lack of sufficient legislative aware-
ness of the problems at hand. This is apparent in section 280 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which on its face makes an interlocutory appeal turn on whether the
court in its discretion conducted a special hearing before it ruled on the admissi-
bility issue. 173
On the other hand, the basis-of-recovery exception in section 304 of the Code
of Civil Procedure suffers not from poor draftsmanship, but from serious concep-
tual problems inherent in the distinction between the basis and the amount of
recovery. The significant expenditure of judicial efforts at clarification of this dis-
tinction appears to be out of proportion to the benefits derived from the
exception. 174
The device of limited appeal, yet another exception to the finality requirement,
is a remnant from an earlier period in the history of civil procedure. To this day,
more than one hundred years after the German Code of Civil Procedure was
enacted, the role of limited appeal in an appellate system based on the finality
principle has not been redefined. Currently, there remains the paradox that less
important interlocutory decisions in the form of orders are subject to review by
171. See FGG § 28; GVERG § 136; GG art. 100(1), (2). These rules do not specify any point during
the proceedings at which the court may or may not exercise its power to order the certification of a
question.
172. See supra pp. 45-46.
173. Se supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
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limited appeal, while interlocutory judgments on matters of procedure (with the
exception of those on the admissibility of the complaint under section 280), are
not, pursuant to section 303 of the Code of Civil Procedure, separately
appealable. 175
Certification of a legal question does not, strictly speaking, constitute a depar-
ture from the finality principle in those cases where the final judgment of the certi-
fying court is not reviewable. Rather, it functions to some degree as a substitute
for an appeal; nonetheless, the use of this device produces certain problems which
are also associated with interlocutory appeals. 17 6
A complete overhaul of the German system of civil appellate jurisdiction seems
advisable. The present system can best be characterized as a glaring example of
how not to do it.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61. This conclusion is compelled by a comparison of
section 280 with section 303.
176. See supra pp. 57-58.
[Vol. 47: No. 3
